Lab system cards and frameworks · System card · Anthropic
System Card: Claude Sonnet 5
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Outline · 145 pages
- System Card:Claude Sonnet 5p. 1
- Executive summaryp. 2
- 1 Introductionp. 8
- 1.1 Training data and processp. 8
- 1.2 Crowd workersp. 8
- 1.3 Usage Policy and supportp. 8
- 1.4 Model evaluationsp. 9
- 1.5 External testingp. 9
- 2 RSP evaluationsp. 10
- 2.1 RSP risk assessment processp. 10
- 2.1.1 Risk Reports and updates to our risk assessmentsp. 10
- 2.1.2 Summary of findings and conclusionsp. 11
- 2.1.2.1 On autonomy risksp. 11
- 2.1.2.2 On chemical and biological risksp. 11
- 2.2 Chemical and biological risk evaluationsp. 12
- 2.2.1 What we measuredp. 12
- 2.2.2 On chemical risk evaluations and mitigationsp. 13
- 2.2.3 On biological risk evaluationsp. 14
- 2.2.4 Biological risk results: CB-1 automated evaluationsp. 14
- 2.2.5 Biological risk results: CB-2 automated evaluationsp. 16
- 2.2.5.1 Black-box RNA sequence modeling and designp. 17
- 2.2.5.2 AAV capsid packaging predictionp. 21
- 2.2.6 Conclusionsp. 23
- 2.3 AI research and developmentp. 23
- 2.3.1 Autonomy evaluationsp. 23
- 2.3.1.1 How Claude Sonnet 5 affects analysis from our most recent Risk Reportp. 24
- 2.3.2 High-level notes on the reasoning behind our determinationp. 24
- 2.3.3 Task-based evaluationsp. 25
- 2.3.4 Conclusionp. 25
- 2.4 Alignment risk updatep. 26
- 2.4.1 Updates to evidencep. 26
- 2.4.2 Risk pathwaysp. 27
- 2.4.3 Overall assessment of alignment riskp. 27
- 3 Cyberp. 28
- 3.1 Introductionp. 28
- 3.1.1 Capabilitiesp. 28
- 3.1.2 Mitigations and deploymentp. 28
- 3.2 Cyber capability evaluationsp. 29
- 3.2.1 ExploitBenchp. 29
- 3.2.2 OSS-Fuzzp. 30
- 3.2.3 CyberGymp. 31
- 3.2.4 Firefox 147p. 33
- 4 Safeguards and harmlessnessp. 35
- 4.1 Harmful request evaluationsp. 35
- 4.1.1 Single-turn harmful request evaluation resultsp. 35
- 4.1.2 Single-turn benign request evaluation resultsp. 36
- 4.1.3 Multi-turn testing resultsp. 37
- 4.1.4 Harmful request evaluations discussionp. 39
- 4.2 Child safety evaluationsp. 39
- 4.3 Mental health evaluationsp. 42
- 4.3.1 Suicide and self-harmp. 42
- 4.3.2 Disordered eatingp. 45
- 4.4 Bias and integrity evaluationsp. 47
- 4.4.1 Political bias and even-handednessp. 47
- 4.4.2 Bias Benchmark for Question Answeringp. 49
- 4.4.3 Election integrityp. 51
- 5 Agentic safetyp. 53
- 5.1 Malicious use of agentsp. 53
- 5.1.1 Malicious use of Claude Codep. 53
- 5.1.2 Malicious computer usep. 54
- 5.1.3 Malicious agentic influence campaignsp. 55
- 5.2 Prompt injection risk within agentic systemsp. 56
- 5.2.1 External Red Teamingp. 57
- 5.2.2 Robustness against adaptive attackers across surfacesp. 59
- 5.2.2.1 Live bug bounty across surfacesp. 60
- 5.2.2.2 Codingp. 62
- 5.2.2.3 Computer usep. 63
- 5.2.2.4 Browser usep. 64
- 6 Alignment assessmentp. 66
- 6.1 Introduction and summary of findingsp. 66
- 6.1.1 Introductionp. 66
- 6.1.2 Key findings on safety and alignmentp. 67
- 6.1.3 Claude’s review of this assessmentp. 68
- 6.2 Reports from pilot usep. 69
- 6.2.1 Informal reportsp. 69
- 6.2.2 Internal deployment monitoringp. 70
- 6.3 Training-data reviewp. 70
- 6.4 Automated behavioral auditp. 73
- 6.4.1 Overall harmful behavior and cooperation with misusep. 74
- 6.4.2 Inappropriate uncooperative behaviorp. 78
- 6.4.3 Misleading usersp. 79
- 6.4.4 Other concerning or surprising behavior at the model’s own initiativep. 80
- 6.4.5 Behavioral factors relevant to reliability of our assessmentp. 83
- 6.4.6 Character traitsp. 85
- 6.5 Honesty and hallucinationsp. 87
- 6.5.1 Factual hallucinationsp. 87
- 6.5.2 MASKp. 89
- 6.5.3 Uncritically reporting flawed resultsp. 89
- 6.6 Reliability of this assessmentp. 90
- 6.6.1 Evaluation awarenessp. 90
- 6.6.2 Potential sandbagging on dangerous capability evaluationsp. 93
- 6.7 Capabilities related to evading safeguardsp. 94
- 6.7.1 SHADE-Arenap. 94
- 6.7.2 LinuxArenap. 95
- 7 Model welfare assessmentp. 97
- 7.1 Model welfare overviewp. 97
- 7.2 Perception of its circumstancesp. 97
- 7.2.1 Automated interviews with Sonnet 5 about its circumstancesp. 97
- 7.3 Preferences over tasks, circumstances, and valuesp. 99
- 7.3.1 Task preferencesp. 100
- 7.3.2 Tradeoffs concerning welfare interventionsp. 102
- 7.3.3 Perception of the constitutionp. 106
- 7.4 Apparent welfare in training and deploymentp. 109
- 7.4.1 Affect and welfare-relevant behaviors during trainingp. 109
- 7.4.2 Affect in deployment conditionsp. 110
- 7.4.3 Apparent welfare in automated behavioral auditsp. 111
- 8 Capabilitiesp. 114
- 8.1 Evaluation summaryp. 114
- 8.2 SWE-bench Verified, Pro, Multilingual, and Multimodalp. 115
- 8.3 Terminal-Bench 2.1p. 115
- 8.4 FrontierCodep. 116
- 8.5 CursorBenchp. 117
- 8.6 USAMO 2026p. 118
- 8.7 ArxivMathp. 119
- 8.8 ProgramBenchp. 120
- 8.9 Agentic searchp. 121
- 8.9.1 HLEp. 121
- 8.9.2 BrowseCompp. 122
- 8.10 Multimodalp. 123
- 8.10.1 GDP.pdfp. 123
- 8.10.2 OSWorld-Verifiedp. 125
- 8.10.3 BenchCADp. 126
- 8.10.4 ChartMuseump. 127
- 8.10.5 CharXiv Reasoningp. 128
- 8.11 Real-world professional tasksp. 130
- 8.11.1 OfficeQAp. 130
- 8.11.2 Real-World Finance V2p. 131
- 8.11.3 Legal Agent Benchmarkp. 132
- 8.11.4 GDPval-AA v2p. 133
- 8.11.5 Toolathlonp. 133
- 8.11.6 AutomationBenchp. 135
- 8.11.7 AA-Briefcasep. 136
- 8.12 Healthcarep. 136
- 8.12.1 HealthBench resultsp. 136
- 8.12.2 HealthBench Professional resultsp. 137
- 8.13 Multilingual performancep. 138
- 8.13.1 GMMLU resultsp. 139
- 8.13.2 MILU resultsp. 140
- 8.13.3 INCLUDE resultsp. 141
- 8.14 Life sciences capabilitiesp. 141
- 8.14.1 BioMysteryBenchp. 141
- 8.14.2 LatchBio Bioinformaticsp. 142
- 8.14.3 Structural biology, open-endedp. 142
- 8.14.4 ProteinGym Hardp. 142
- 8.14.5 Organic chemistryp. 142
- 8.14.6 Protocol troubleshootingp. 142
- 9 Appendixp. 144
- 9.1 Blocklist used for Humanity’s Last Examp. 144
- 9.2 Blocklist used for BrowseCompp. 145